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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Charles Stubbs appeals his conviction for robbery and 
related offenses based upon several claims of error 
including the legality of his warrantless arrest, and the 
adequacy of his purported waiver of trial counsel. 
Inasmuch as we agree that the waiver colloquy was not 
sufficient to insure a proper waiver of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, we will reverse and remand for a new trial. 
 
I. Background 
 
On October 5, 1999, FBI agents received a tip from a 
confidential informant that Larry Brown and Walter Baynes 
were planning to rob a bank the next day. The same 
informant had previously told the FBI that Brown had 
robbed the PNC Bank on Frankstown Road in Penn Hills, 
Pennsylvania two weeks earlier. That robbery was 
"takeover" style, where the perpetrators went behind the 
counters and took cash from bank tellers' drawers. 
 
Based on this information, agents placed Brown under 
surveillance. On the morning of October 6, agents saw two 
men arrive at Brown's house. One arrived in a tan Dodge, 
and the other arrived in a blue Chevrolet. Both men left in 
the tan Dodge along with Brown. Agents followed the Dodge 
to the same strip mall where the PNC Bank robbery had 
occurred on Frankstown Road two weeks earlier. They saw 
the Dodge "square" the block (drive all the way around), 
and then leave the area and travel to another shopping mall 
containing a number of banks. 
 
The next morning, October 7, two men again arrived at 
Brown's house. This time the three men left in the blue 
Chevrolet. Once again agents followed as the men drove to 
the mall containing the PNC Bank. The agents observed 
Brown as he left the car and went into a drugstore in the 
mall. He looked into the bank upon entering and leaving 
the drugstore. The three men then left the strip mall and 
parked in a nearby cemetery for a few minutes. They then 
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drove back to the strip mall and once again "squared" the 
block. The Chevrolet was next seen in the parking lot of the 
Squirrel Hill PNC Bank. The agents continued their 
surveillance as the Chevrolet left that parking lot and 
returned to the parking lot in the Frankstown Road mall. 
Agents then saw the passenger in the back seat pull a ski 
mask over his head. After a few minutes, the three men 
drove to another PNC Bank in the Great Valley Shopping 
Center. There, two of the men got out of the car, walked 
toward the bank, but then turned around. 
 
Agents lost track of the car at 1:23 p.m. in Wilkinsburg. 
However, at 1:46 p.m. a radio dispatch notified the agents 
that a Dollar Bank in the Monroeville Miracle Mile 
Shopping Center had just been robbed. The dispatch said 
that the crime was committed by three males wearing ski 
masks and carrying handguns, and was a "takeover" 
robbery. Witnesses said that the robbers placed the money 
in a Kaufmann's shopping bag. 
 
The agents concluded that Brown and his companions 
had robbed that bank after they lost sight of them, and the 
agents proceeded to Brown's house to await his return. The 
blue Chevrolet did return to Brown's home shortly after 2 
p.m. Larry Brown, Jasper Stubbs, and the defendant, 
Charles Stubbs, were in the car. Agents immediately 
arrested the three men without a warrant, and then 
conducted a warrantless search of the car. They found a 
Kaufmann's shopping bag containing currency, ski masks, 
gloves, and handguns. Stubbs was thereafter formally 
charged with the Dollar Bank robbery, and counsel was 
appointed to represent him. Before trial, the cases against 
the three men were severed. 
 
Stubbs began his trial represented by a court appointed 
attorney. However, about halfway through Stubbs' defense 
case, and after the prosecution had rested its case-in-chief, 
Stubbs asked to represent himself for the remainder of the 
trial. After a brief discussion, the trial judge agreed, and the 
trial proceeded with Stubbs representing himself. Not 
surprisingly, the jury convicted him of all five of the counts 
in the indictment, and the court subsequently sentenced 
him to a total of 562 months incarceration. This appeal 
followed. 
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Although Stubbs makes numerous arguments on appeal, 
the only one that we need to address at length involves his 
purported waiver of counsel.1 Stubbs argues that his waiver 
of counsel was not knowing and intelligent as required by 
the Sixth Amendment. We agree. 
 
II. The Waiver of Counsel Issue2 
 
Although Stubbs was represented by appointed counsel 
throughout most of the trial, he informed the court of his 
dissatisfaction with counsel and asked permission to 
represent himself before the trial ended. His request 
prompted the following exchange: 
 
       The Court: You wanted to see me before the 
       jury comes in? 
 
       [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, in speaking with my 
       client this morning, he indicated 
       to me he wishes to address the 
       Court regarding a certain matter. 
       I don't know the nature of the 
       matter. He wishes now to speak. 
 
       The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. Things that I 
       have been telling my lawyer to try 
       to accomplish here, he's not done. 
       As of now, I feel as though my 
       lawyer is ineffective and I wish to 
       represent myself for the 
       remainder of this trial. 
 
       The CourtSo what you're asking is that you 
       be allowed to testify without 
       examination from Mr. Cogan and 
       then give your closing statement? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We briefly discuss infra Stubbs' argument that there was no probable 
cause to support his warrantless arrest. We summarily dismiss Stubbs' 
claim that the district court improperly used a prior conviction to 
enhance his sentence. 
 
2. Our review of whether a defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing 
and intelligent is plenary as it involves only legal issues. See Gov't of 
the 
Virgin Islands v. Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 404 (3d Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Velasquez, 886 F.2d 1076, 1086 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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       The Defendant: Excuse me? 
 
       The Court: I guess what you're asking me to 
       allow you to do is to testify 
       without Mr. Cogan questioning 
       you--of course, you would be 
       subject to cross examination-- 
 
       The Defendant: No, I'm going to do my own thing. 
 
       The Court: Well, your own thing has to be 
       within the confines of the trial 
       procedures. If you want to-- 
 
       The Defendant: I am going to represent myself as 
       of now. 
 
       The Court: Okay. Let me explain what's left 
       in the trial. What's left in the trial 
       is your testimony or any other 
       witness you might have here to 
       call and the closing arguments. 
       That's all that's left in the trial. 
 
       The Defendant: No, there's evidence that I want to 
       admit. 
 
       The Court: Well, if it's admissible, certainly it 
       can be offered and the 
       Government can object to it and 
       I'll make rulings. 
 
       The Defendant: Thank you. 
 
       The Court: But before we continue, Ms. Kelly, 
       do you have anything to say 
       about this? 
 
       [The Prosecutor]: Well, I would just like to say that 
       I think Mr. Cogan has been 
       representing Mr. Stubbs quite 
       well; and that if he's now decided 
       that he no longer wants Mr. 
       Cogan to represent him, then I 
       think maybe the Court should 
       advise him of the consequences of 
       that, although they are pretty 
       obvious, and go from there. 
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       The Court: Well, maybe I'm leaving some 
       things out, but you know you are 
       entitled to be represented by an 
       attorney. You understand that? 
 
       The Defendant: Yes I do. And I also know that I'm 
       entitled to represent myself if I 
       wish to. 
 
       The Court: You understand that if you make 
       this decision, anything you do is 
       subject to objection by counsel, 
       and that if that objection is well 
       taken, I might grant that 
       objection. And that you are only 
       entitled, as I have said several 
       times, to represent yourself in 
       accordance with the Rules of 
       Criminal Procedure, the Rules of 
       Evidence, and the Rules of Court 
       as they pertain to this case. You 
       can't do whatever you want to do 
       if it is not legally permissible, if 
       evidence is not legally admissible 
       or legally competent. Do you 
       understand that? 
 
       The Defendant: No, not really. 
 
       The Court: Well, I'm telling you that. That 
       you are not allowed to do 
       everything you want to because 
       you want to do it. There are rules 
       of Evidence, there are Rules of 
       Procedure-- 
 
       The Defendant: All I'm saying is if I have some 
       documents that we have received 
       already, like such as FBI logs, 
       things like that, that I want to 
       refer to in basically my closing-- 
 
       The Court: Well, you can't refer to any facts 
       that are not in evidence. That's 
       one thing. 
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       The Defendant: That's why I said I want to enter 
       this stuff in evidence because 
       there was just a bunch of lies told 
       there was just simply a bunch of 
       lies told. 
 
       The Court: Well, that's not for me to decide, 
       for you to decide, or for the 
       Government to decide. That's for 
       the jury to decide. 
 
       The Defendant: Exactly, that's what I am saying. 
       I have documentations [sic] that 
       say they lied. 
 
       The Court: Ms. Kelly, I don't know, I agree 
       that Mr. Stubbs should be aware 
       of the consequences of 
       representing himself because you 
       don't know, as you have 
       admitted, the Rules of Evidence, 
       the Rules of Procedure. I'm not 
       really sure if there's anything else 
       that the Government feels that he 
       should be told. And if there is, 
       please let me know. I am not 
       really sure either whether or not I 
       can tell Mr. Stubbs that he can't 
       represent himself. I don't think I 
       can say that. But certainly I can 
       say this: That the Government's 
       evidence is already in. The 
       evidence of Mr. Moses is already 
       in. The only possible part of the 
       trial would be your testimony, 
       which you would have to testify 
       under oath if you choose to 
       testify. You are not required to 
       testify. You are not required to do 
       or prove anything on your behalf 
       because it's the Government's 
       burden to prove that you are 
       guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
       But if you do testify, do you 
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       understand that you are subject 
       to cross-examination by the 
       Government's attorney? 
 
       The Defendant: There is no reason for me to 
       testify if I'm representing myself. I 
       can tell the jury what I want them 
       to know from my own mouth. 
 
       The Court: You may not argue facts that are 
       not in evidence. I can tell you 
       that. 
 
       The Defendant: That's why I'm--Your Honor, I'm 
       saying that I want-- 
 
       The Court: Do you want to put--do you want 
       to make offers now or do you 
       want to wait until the jury comes 
       in and I will make rulings on 
       whatever you want to admit? 
 
       The Defendant: I want to offer--I don't know 
       exactly--I may touch on a lot of 
       things that-- 
 
       The Court: Offer a piece of evidence if you 
       have evidence to introduce in 
       your case. Or do you want me to 
       bring the jury in and do it--do 
       you want it in front of the jury? 
 
       The Defendant: It doesn't matter to me. 
 
       The Court: It does matter. I think it should 
       be probably. I don't know. Does 
       anybody have any thoughts? 
 
       . . . 
 
       [Defense Counsel]: Judge, as a matter of procedure, 
       I think Mr. Stubbs would have to 
       be advised at this point of the 
       consequences of his actions and 
       then if he-- 
 
       The Court: What are the consequences of his 
       action? I told him he has to follow 
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       the rules, he has to follow the 
       Rules of Procedure, the Rules of 
       Evidence, and if you--well-- 
 
       [The Prosecutor]: And he can't say he wants to 
       represent himself to introduce his 
       own testimony and avoid taking 
       the witness stand. 
 
       The Court: That's certainly true. And I hope 
       you understand that. You say, 
       why should I testify when I can 
       tell the jury the facts that aren't 
       in evidence. So if there hasn't 
       been sworn testimony of those 
       facts in evidence, you are going to 
       be precluded from arguing that to 
       a jury. Because a person who 
       closes can only argue the 
       evidence. That's what a closing 
       argument is. A person argues-- 
 
       The Defendant: So you are saying to me-- 
 
       The Court: Excuse me, will you allow me to 
       finish. A person argues the 
       evidence that is presented before 
       a jury. A person doesn't just talk 
       to the jury and introduce 
       evidence without being subject to 
       cross-examination. That's not 
       how a trial works. 
 
       The Defendant: Listen, again, I'm saying that 
       there are certain lies that I know 
       have been told from certain FBI 
       logs, do you understand what I'm 
       saying-- 
 
       The Court: No, I don't understand a word of 
       what you're saying. 
 
       The Defendant: If you would let me finish. And 
       testimony given by bank tellers, 
       bank security management, and 
       things like that. 
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Stubbs Br. at 21-26. The court ultimately allowed Stubbs 
to represent himself, but ordered defense counsel to serve 
as "stand by" counsel throughout the remainder of the trial.3 
Id. at 26. 
 
A. 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. 
VI. The Supreme Court has construed this to mean that 
"the guiding hand of counsel" must be made available in 
criminal trials to those that can not afford to hire an 
attorney on their own. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 
308 (1973); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963). 
 
It is now clear, however, that the Sixth Amendment also 
guarantees the right of self-representation. The Supreme 
Court has recognized that that right is necessarily 
embodied in the Sixth Amendment, as "the Constitution 
does not force a lawyer upon a defendant." See Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975), quoting Adams v. 
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1943). In 
Faretta, the trial judge found that the criminal defendant 
had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense, and 
required court appointed counsel to conduct the defense 
instead. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808-09. On appeal, the 
defendant claimed that he had a Sixth Amendment right to 
conduct his own defense, and that the trial court's denial of 
that right required a new trial. The Supreme Court agreed, 
finding that the rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment 
"grant[] . . . [an] accused personally the right to make his 
defense." Id. at 819. The Court reasoned that although the 
Sixth Amendment was intended as a protection for the 
defendant, "thrust[ing] counsel upon the accused against 
his considered wish, . . . violates the logic of the 
Amendment." Id. at 820. 
 
The Sixth Amendment thus embodies two competing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As standby counsel, Cogan was instructed to sit at the table with 
Stubbs and make himself available in the event that Stubbs had any 
questions. 
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rights because exercising the right to self-representation 
necessarily means waiving the right to counsel. See Buhl v. 
Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 789 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
       It is axiomatic that a criminal defendant's waiver of a 
       constitutional right must be voluntary, knowing and 
       intelligent. Therefore, the constitutional right of self- 
       representation in a criminal case is conditioned upon a 
       voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to 
       be represented by counsel. 
 
Buhl, 233 F.3d at 798. Further, "we do not presume 
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." Johnson, 
304 U.S. at 464, citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities 
Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937). Therefore, we"indulge 
every reasonable presumption against waiver" of the right 
to counsel. Id., citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 
389, 393 (1937); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 
(1948). Moreover, inasmuch as the right to counsel is 
fundamental to due process and the criminal justice 
system, its denial can never be harmless error. See United 
States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1995), citing 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967). 
 
In United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982) we 
held that a court must undertake a two-prong inquiry when 
a defendant expresses a desire to either substitute counsel 
or proceed pro se on the eve of trial. The court must first 
determine if the accused can "show good cause[for 
dismissing counsel], such as a conflict of interest, a 
complete breakdown in communication, or an irreconcilable 
conflict with his attorney." Welty, 674 F.2d at 188. 
However, "[i]f the reasons are made known to the court, the 
court may rule without more." Id., quoting Brown v. United 
States, 264 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (en banc) 
(Burger, J. concurring in part). We held that if good cause 
does exist, counsel should be dismissed "even though it 
may necessitate continuing the trial." Id. However, if the 
defendant does not establish good cause, the defendant 
then has to chose between proceeding pro se, or accepting 
counsel's representation and stewardship. Id.  
 
Where, as here, a defendant only wants to proceed pro se 
and does not request substitute counsel, the first prong of 
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the inquiry takes on less significance. See Buhl , 233 F.3d at 
798. However, the defendant's motives may still be relevant 
as they may shed light on whether the defendant's waiver 
has been made knowingly and intelligently. See id.  
 
Here, the colloquy between the court and Stubbs shows 
that Stubbs wished to dismiss his counsel because Stubbs 
was dissatisfied with his attorney's performance, and 
because Stubbs wanted to address the jury directly. 4 
Stubbs' request to proceed pro se came at a time when the 
trial was well underway; the prosecution had finished 
introducing evidence in its case-in-chief. Therefore, the 
circumstances here do not fit neatly into the parameters we 
discussed in Welty. Nevertheless, the guiding principles of 
Welty still assist our analysis of Stubbs' Faretta claim. 
 
There is no issue here as to whether Stubbs "clearly and 
unequivocally" asserted his right to counsel as is required 
under the Sixth Amendment. Buhl, 233 F.3d at 792. After 
defense counsel informed the trial court that Stubbs 
wanted to represent himself, Stubbs then confirmed to the 
court: "I'm going to do my own thing. . . . I am going to 
represent myself as of now." When the court responded by 
reiterating that Stubbs was entitled to be represented by an 
attorney, Stubbs replied: "And I also know that I'm entitled 
to represent myself if I wish to." Stubbs' Br. at 22-23. This 
was clearly not a request for substitute counsel, and it was 
just as clearly and unambiguously an assertion of the right 
to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment. 5 
 
This imposed a "serious and weighty responsibility upon 
the trial court [to determine] whether there[was] an 
intelligent and competent waiver by the accused." Buhl, 233 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As noted above, Stubbs told the court: "there's evidence that I want to 
admit[,]" Stubbs Br. at 22, and "I have some documents . . . FBI logs, 
things like that, that I want to refer to in basically my closing[.]" Id. 
at 
23. He also told court: "There is no reason for me to testify if I'm 
representing myself. I can tell the jury what I want them to know from 
my own mouth." Id. at 24. 
 
5. A defendant need not "recite some talismanic formula hoping to open 
the eyes and ears of the court to his request" to invoke his/her Sixth 
Amendment rights under Faretta. Buhl, 233 F.3d at 791, quoting Dorman 
v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 1358, 1366 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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F.3d at 799. In Welty, and again in Buhl , we defined the 
inquiry that a trial court must undertake under these 
circumstances. We stated: 
 
       the district court should advise [the defendant] in 
       unequivocal terms both of the technical problems he 
       may encounter in acting as his own attorney and of the 
       risks he takes if his defense efforts are unsuccessful. 
       The district court judge should tell the defendant, for 
       example, that he will have to conduct his defense in 
       accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
       Criminal Procedure, rules with which he may not be 
       familiar; that the defendant may be hampered in 
       presenting his best defense by his lack of knowledge of 
       the law; and that the effectiveness of his defense may 
       well be diminished by his dual role as attorney and 
       accused. In addition, as Justice Black wrote in Von 
       Moltke v. Gillies . . . (t)o be valid (a defendant's) waiver 
       must be made with an apprehension of the nature of 
       the charges, the statutory offenses included within 
       them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, 
       possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in 
       mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a 
       broad understanding of the whole matter. 
 
Welty, 674 F.2d at 188-89 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Buhl, 233 
F.3d at 799 (quoting Welty); Salemo, 61 F.3d at 220. We 
also stressed that "[p]erfunctory questioning is not 
sufficient." Welty, 674 F.2d at 799. 
 
The specificity and care required of the trial court are 
dictated by the gravity of the defendant's actions in waiving 
the protections endemic in representation by skilled defense 
counsel: 
 
       [w]hen an accused manages his own defense, he 
       relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the 
       traditional benefits associated with the right to 
       counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, 
       the accused must `knowingly and intelligently' forego 
       those relinquished benefits. Although a defendant need 
       not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in 
       order competently and intelligently to choose self- 
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       representation, he should be made aware of the 
       dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so 
       that the record will establish that `he knows what he is 
       doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' 
 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (citations omitted). A court should 
only accept a waiver after making a searching inquiry 
sufficient to satisfy the court that the defendant's wavier 
was understanding and voluntary. Welty, 674 F.2d at 189; 
McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 942 (3d Cir. 1987); 
Salemo, 61 F.3d at 220. Thus, a court ought not to accept 
a waiver absent "a penetrating and comprehensive 
examination of all the circumstances." Buhl , 233 F.3d at 
799, quoting Welty, 674 F.2d at 189. 
 
The court's inquiry here does not satisfy that standard. 
 
B. 
 
The district court did inform Stubbs of the technical 
problems he faced in general. The court told Stubbs of the 
problems that could arise under the Rules of Evidence and 
Criminal Procedure, as well as the local court rules. The 
court's comments to Stubbs included the following: 
 
       You understand that if you make this decision, 
       anything you do is subject to objection by counsel, and 
       that if that objection is well taken, I might grant that 
       objection. And that you are only entitled, as I have said 
       several times, to represent yourself in accordance with 
       the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules of Evidence, 
       the Rules of Court as they pertain to this case. You 
       can't do whatever you want to if it is not legally 
       permissible, if evidence is not legally admissible or 
       legally competent. 
 
Stubbs' Br. at 23. However, the court then asked Stubbs: 
"Do you understand that?" and Stubbs replied:"No, not 
really." Id. The court then tried to elaborate, but only 
reiterated what it had already explained. The court said: 
"Well, I'm telling you that. That you are not allowed to do 
anything you want to because you want to do it. There are 
rules of Evidence, . . ." Id. Stubbs then insisted that he 
wanted to refer to some specific documents in his closing, 
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and the court properly told him that he could not refer to 
anything that was not in evidence. See id. However, Stubbs 
replied to that by insisting that that was the very reason 
that he wanted to "enter this stuff in evidence because 
there was just a bunch of lies told there was simply a 
bunch of lies told." Id. After hearing from the court that it 
was not the court's job to determine what were lies, Stubbs 
persisted: "Exactly, that's what I am saying. I have 
documentations that say they lied." Id. The court then 
shifted out of this verbal impasse and told Stubbs that he 
was not required to testify, that the government's evidence 
was already in, and "the only possible part of the trial 
would be your testimony which you would have to testify 
under oath if you chose to testify . . . But if you do testify, 
do you understand that you are subject to cross- 
examination. . . " Id. at 24. 
 
The court's summary of the phases of the trial that 
remained did not inform Stubbs of the possibility of 
rebuttal and sur rebuttal. However, there is a far more 
glaring and substantive omission. It is obvious from the 
exchange between Stubbs and the court that Stubbs 
wanted to proceed pro se so he could bring certain matters 
to the attention of the jury and address the jury directly, 
thereby avoiding the need of testifying under oath. Yet, it is 
clear that Stubbs never understood that proceeding pro se 
would not allow him to inform the jury of anything that he 
could not also inform the jury of if represented by counsel. 
The court did explain that Stubbs would be limited by the 
Rules of Evidence but it is clear from the exchange that 
Stubbs believed he would have certain evidentiary 
advantages by proceeding pro se. Moreover, Stubbs clearly 
told the court that he did not understand what the court 
was saying about the Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
when the court tried to elaborate, and the court never 
attempted to explain in terms that Stubbs would 
understand.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Of course, it may be that Stubbs really did understand and was 
simply being obstinate. However, we can not conclude that on this 
record. Moreover, a court must take care that a purported waiver of the 
Sixth Amendment is knowing and voluntary, even if the defendant is 
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The court did attempt to elaborate upon how the Rules of 
Evidence and Procedure could limit Stubbs in presenting a 
defense. The court told Stubbs: "So if there hasn't been 
sworn testimony of those facts in evidence, you are going to 
be precluded from arguing that to a jury. Because a person 
who closes can only argue the evidence. That's what a 
closing argument is. A person argues --." Stubbs' Br. at 25. 
Stubbs then apparently tried to obtain some clarification by 
asking: "So you are saying to me --" However, the court 
responded: "Excuse me, you will allow me to finish," id. at 
25, and continued explaining that Stubbs could not speak 
to the jury. However, the court did not respond to Stubbs' 
concern in a manner that was sufficiently clear to allow us 
to conclude that Stubbs fully understood what he was 
doing. In fact, after this exchange, Stubbs simply replied: 
"Listen, again, I'm saying that there are certain lies that I 
know have been told from certain FBI logs, do you 
understand what I'm saying?" Id. The Court told Stubbs it 
did not understand and Stubbs (not to be outdone by the 
court's admonition to not interrupt) replied: "If you would 
let me finish;" and continued his discussion about the bank 
tellers. Defense counsel was then given a moment with 
Stubbs, and the exchange appears to have concluded at 
that point.7 Id. at 26. 
 
In addition, the court also failed to warn Stubbs of the 
disadvantages and pitfalls of playing the dual role of 
attorney and accused. Other than mentioning the potential 
procedural problems, the record is devoid of the kind of 
warnings that we have previously found sufficient to accept 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
being obstinate. See Welty, 674 F.2d at 189. ("While we can understand, 
and perhaps even sympathize, with the frustration and exasperation of 
the district court judge, even well-founded suspicions of intentional 
delay 
and manipulative tactics can provide no substitute for the inquiries 
necessary to protect a defendant's constitutional rights.") 
 
7. Nothing further appears in the Appendix or Stubbs' Brief, and the 
Government has not provided us with any additional excerpts from the 
trial transcript to establish that the court conducted any further 
inquiries. Accordingly, we presume that what we have set forth 
constitutes the entire exchange between the court and Stubbs on the 
issue of his waiver of counsel. 
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a waiver of defense counsel. See e.g. Gov't of the Virgin 
Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468, 472 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(upholding defendant's waiver of counsel where the trial 
judge warned the defendant that "a person who has himself 
for a lawyer is a fool[.]").8  
 
As the trial judge did not properly advise Stubbs of the 
pitfalls of self-representation, we conclude that the trial 
court's colloquy with Stubbs does not satisfy the minimum 
standards of Faretta. We can not conclude that Stubbs 
"kn[ew] what he [was] doing and his choice [was] made with 
eyes open." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, quoting Adams, 317 
U.S. at 279. Accordingly, we hold that Stubbs' waiver of 
counsel was not made knowingly and intelligently. 9 
 
The fact that the trial court instructed Mr. Cogan to serve 
as standby counsel for the remainder of the trial does not 
change our analysis. Nowhere in Faretta or our 
pronouncements in Welty do we suggest that the presence 
of standby counsel would alter our analysis of the facts on 
this record. Stubbs did not request co-counsel; he 
requested to act as his own counsel. In certain 
circumstances, the appointment of standby counsel may 
even be incongruous with the exercise of the right to self- 
representation. See e.g. Buhl, 233 F.3d at 802 (finding the 
hybrid representation of standby counsel and the 
defendant's exercise of the right to represent himself 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We realize, of course, that this precise language will often only add 
fuel to the fire and we do not in any way suggest that a court must 
inform a defendant of the pitfalls of self representation in these words. 
We merely mention James by way of example of the types of problems a 
court must inform the accused of when deciding whether to accept a 
waiver of counsel. 
 
9. We reject Stubbs' argument, however, that he was not adequately 
informed of the nature of the charges and the range of punishments 
against him. Although the trial judge did not specifically advise Stubbs 
to that effect, Stubbs had previously been advised on these matters at 
the Initial Appearance, see App. at 5, the Detention Hearing, see App. at 
71, as well as at his Arraignment, see App. at 77-78. This court has 
previously upheld a waiver of counsel as valid where the trial judge 
failed 
to tell the defendant the nature of charges and range of penalties, but 
the defendant had already been reminded of this information on two 
prior occasions. See McFadden, 630 F.2d at 972. 
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"inconsistent with the core of the constitutional right that 
[the defendant] was attempting to assert."). In any event, 
the record submitted on appeal here does not suggest that 
standby counsel played any part in aiding Stubbs during 
the remainder of the trial or ameliorating the disadvantages 
Stubbs would naturally face as both counsel and accused. 
 
The government argues that since the trial was almost 
over when Stubbs asked to represent himself, the potential 
dangers of self-representation were markedly reduced. First 
of all, we reject this argument because it assumes that 
defense counsel did not have much more to present in 
response to the government's case. Although that may or 
may not be true, we have not been shown anything on this 
record to support that supposition. 
 
More importantly, however, this argument fails because it 
suggests that any error in the court's colloquy was 
harmless. The government is suggesting that since Stubbs 
enjoyed the protections of representation throughout most 
of the trial, there is little chance that he was prejudiced by 
taking over after nearly all evidence against him was 
admitted. However, that is nothing more than an invitation 
to engage in the harmless error analysis that the Supreme 
Court has rejected in the context of a Sixth Amendment 
waiver of counsel. 
 
       Since the right of self-representation is a right that 
       when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a 
       trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is 
       not amenable to "harmless error" analysis. The right is 
       either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be 
       harmless. 
 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984).10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Of course, we do not suggest that a defendant can wait until the last 
question is asked of the last witness and then attempt to proceed pro se 
in order to sabotage a criminal proceeding. A defendant who seeks only 
to sabotage a criminal proceeding is not clearly and unequivocally 
waiving his/her right to counsel, and trial courts can prevent such 
tactics from succeeding by relying upon information gained during the 
inquiry required under Welty. We caution, however, that trial courts 
must be careful to avoid allowing the timing of a purported waiver to 
necessarily define the defendant's sincerity in requesting it. 
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III. The Probable Cause Issue 
 
Stubbs also argues that the FBI agents lacked probable 
cause for the warrantless arrest and that the physical 
evidence that was seized is tainted by an illegal search. The 
district court denied Stubbs' motion to exclude the 
informant's tip, and then found that the tip, in conjunction 
with the activity observed during the surveillance, 
constituted probable cause to arrest. The court held that 
the car was validly searched incident to a valid arrest and 
that the physical evidence derived from that search was 
therefore admissible. Inasmuch as this may be an issue on 
remand, we will address Stubbs' challenge to the physical 
evidence. Our review of the district court's legal 
determinations as to the legality of the seizure of the 
evidence is plenary. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 
690, 697 (1996); United States v. Harple, 202 F.3d 194, 196 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
 
Police have probable cause to arrest if the circumstances 
are sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that a 
crime has been committed and the person to be arrested 
committed it. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Paff 
v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000). Probable 
cause is determined by the "totality of the circumstances." 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983); Sharrar v. 
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997). We must assess 
the "knowledge and information which the officers 
possessed at the time of arrest, coupled with the factual 
occurrences immediately precipitating the arrest" in 
determining if probable cause existed. United States v. 
Harris, 482 F.2d 1115, 1117 (3d Cir. 1973)."[P]robable 
cause is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of 
probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Paff, 204 
F.3d at 436, quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 436. 
 
A failure on the part of law enforcement to obtain a 
warrant does not necessarily invalidate an arrest. The 
Supreme Court has held that where an automobile is 
involved, exigent circumstances exist that overcome the 
general warrant requirement due to the automobile's"ready 
mobility." See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 
(1996), citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 
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(1985); see also United States v. Bivens, 445 F.2d 1064, 
1069 (3d Cir. 1971) (upholding warrantless arrest of 
defendant traveling in an automobile where probable cause 
existed to arrest). Further, an individual has a reduced 
expectation of privacy in an automobile due to its pervasive 
regulation. See Labron, 518 U.S. at 940, citing Carney, 471 
U.S. at 393. 
 
In light of these legal principles, Stubbs' challenge to the 
physical evidence does not merit much discussion. An 
informant told the FBI that a bank was going to be robbed, 
and that Brown was going to rob it. Although this alone 
would fall woefully short of probable cause no matter how 
reliable the informant, there is more. The tip was 
corroborated by the surveillance of Brown. As noted above, 
the agents followed Brown and his companions as they 
circled blocks, drove around banks without going in, and 
put on ski masks while parked in the parking lot near one 
of the banks. At that point, the agents could fairly conclude 
that Brown and his companions had not gotten lost on the 
way to a downhill slalom competition. They could 
reasonably assume that the ski masks were going to be 
used in a bank robbery, just as the informant had 
predicted. 
 
On October 7, the agents lost sight of the three men 23 
minutes before the Dollar Bank robbery. The car in which 
the three men were traveling was only five or six miles from 
that bank when agents lost sight of it. The robbery reported 
at the bank was a "takeover" style robbery that was 
consistent with the robbery that had occurred earlier at the 
PNC Bank on Frankstown Road. Agents had been told that 
Brown was involved in that robbery as well. The totality of 
what the agents were told, and what they confirmed with 
their surveillance, along with the proximity of the Dollar 
Bank to where Brown was last seen, clearly established 
probable cause to arrest Brown as well as the two men with 
him. Stubbs was one of those two men. The fact that Brown 
and the two men were traveling in an automobile provided 
the exigent circumstances to arrest without a warrant. See 
Beck, 379 U.S. at 91.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The agents performed a search of the Chevrolet pursuant to the 
arrest of the three men and recovered a number of items, including a 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the convictions and 
judgment of sentence are reversed and this case is 
remanded to the district court for a new trial. 12 
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Kaufmann's shopping bag full of money, ski masks, gloves, and 
handguns. The agents did not have a search warrant."When a 
warrantless search is made pursuant to an arrest,`the constitutional 
validity of the search. . . must depend upon the constitutional validity 
of 
the . . . arrest.' " United States v. Kithcart, 134 F.3d 529, 531 (3d Cir. 
1998), quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 91. As we find the arrest here valid, we 
also find that the search incident to the arrest was also valid. 
 
12. Stubbs also appeals the district court's enhancement of his sentence 
on Count IV on the grounds that the enhancement runs contrary to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000). This argument is meritless. Apprendi makes clear that "[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for 
a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 
(emphasis added). Stubbs' sentence was enhanced by a prior conviction, 
and thus Apprendi does not apply. See United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 
231, 251 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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